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LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
ABSTRACT 
After the horrific wars in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the United Nations 
established two ad hoe tribunals to bring to justice the worst perpetrators of 
atrocities during these conflicts. Even so, despite the tribunals having issued 
numerous indictments, especially in Yugoslavia, the actual apprehension of 
indictees remains extremely unsatisfactory. The blame lies largely with the lack 
of commitment and political will of the countries involved. This paper first 
gives an overview of different categories of so called 'war crimes' and the legal 
framework surrounding the concept of personal criminal liability for these 
offences. It goes on to discuss the means of prosecution of war criminals, with 
an emphasis on ad hoe war crimes tribunals . In the last part the paper examines 
the political considerations obstructing the indictment and apprehension of key 
war criminals with a focus on the conflict in former Yugoslavia. The paper 
argues that most of these considerations are not justified, because sparing these 
offenders sets a bad precedent and thwarts the purpose of deterrence as well as 
national reconciliation in the respective countries. 
This paper comprises 12,894 words, excluding footnotes and bibliography. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
"A person stands a better chance of being tried and judged for killing one human being 
than for killing 100,000. 11 
- Jose Ayala Lasso, former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
The history of mankind - sadly - is a history of war. And the history of war -
probably even more sadly - is one of war crimes. It is said that "war is a dirty 
business" and the conduct of war itself is horrific enough. There are however 
some acts that cross a line, that are so hideous and evil that one is not willing to 
accept them even in a context of war. The concept of a war being ' humane' 
might seem odd at the first glance, as the whole purpose of warfare is essentially 
to exterminate the enemy, which is hardly a humane idea. However, even in an 
extreme situation like a war there have to be some basic rules of conduct. While 
those rules tend to vary in scope and definition they still maintain certain core 
elements of what is considered ' human behaviour' . 
Reports of the recent wars in former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo) and Rwanda leave one shocked by the extent of unthinkable horror that 
humans seem to be able to inflict on each other. And it also immediately creates 
a distinct feeling that these acts are not acceptable and cannot go unpunished. 
Each new atrocity brings a new call for war crimes prosecution, which is 
routinely met with reluctance and caution from those with the power to set such 
a trial in motion. Justice and diplomacy constantly quarrel about whether to 
prosecute or to rehabilitate. It is usually only an unexpected confluence of 
events that leads to the establishment of war crimes tribunals. 1 
The term 'war crimes' is almost as much a part of worldwide popular usage 
as murder. However, unlike murder, 'war crimes' is still far from having the 
benefit of international and national legislation, which provides it with the 
necessary legal specificity that exists in common crimes. Even worse yet, the 
1 Timothy L.H. McCormack and Gerry Simpson (eds) The Law of War Crimes - National and 
International Approaches (Kluver Law International, The Hague/London/Boston, I 997), 8. 
3 
enforcement of those acts has been significantly lacking.2 Most war criminals, 
even the worst offenders, still go untried. 
The trial of former President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Slobodan Milosevic seems to be an exception. Milosevic's trial before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is the most 
important war crimes prosecution since the Nazi leaders were tried at 
Nuremberg. Milosevic himself is the first head of state ever tried for war 
crimes. 3 His trial is a major benchmark for international justice, but it also 
spotlights the failure to arrest other architects of the Balkan wars of thel 990s. 
Richard Dicker, director of Human Rights Watch's International Justice 
Program points out that: 
[t]he trial is a great step forward for justice, but equally notable are those indicted war 
criminals missing from the dock. Too many of the most senior Serb indictees remain at 
large. The blame lies with Balkan governments that have failed to cooperate with the 
tribunal, and with NATO, which has for six years operated in Bosnia without rounding up 
Milosevic's co-conspirators.
4 
Most of the key figures of the war in Yugoslavia are still at large including 
former president of the Serb Democratic Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Radovan Karadzic5 and former Commander of Serb Troops in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, General Ratko Mladic.6 Both have been indicted, but no serious 
efforts have been made to actually arrest them. The same is true for many war 
criminals in various countries. This is partly because the state where the crimes 
have been committed is not willing to prosecute or extradite the offender, and 
2 M. Cherif Bassiouni Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1999), xvii (for crimes against humanity only). 
3 Michael P. Scharf and William A. Schabas, Slobodan Milosevic on Trial: A Companion 
(Continuum, New York, 2002) , 11 . 
4 Human Rights Watch (HRW) Milosevic: Historic Trial Commences (New York, 7 February 
2002), <http ://www.hrw.org/press/2002/02/milotrial.htm> (last accessed 1 November 2002). 5 See: Interpol Warrant of Apprehension 
<http: //www.interpol.int/Public/Wanted/Notices/Data/ 1995/47/ 1995 _ 4774 7.asp> (last accessed 
1 November 2002). 
6 See: Interpol Warrant of Apprehension 
<http ://www.interpol.int/public/Wanted/Notices/Data/ 1995/54/ l 995 _ 47754.asp> (last accessed 
l November 2002). 
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partly because the international community too often betrays the idea of global 
justice for blurred political considerations. 
With the International Court of Justice (ICC) being established and the 
ongoing process of codification and definition for some of the most hideous war 
crimes, today the legal framework for the prosecution of these violations of 
international law is becoming more and more comprehensive. However, as long 
as war criminals can usually expect to remain unpunished because indictments 
are withheld for political reasons, international justice cannot be achieved.7 
In searching for excuses not to prosecute alleged perpetrators of wartime 
atrocities it is often argued that criminal responsibility for these offences 
constitute a 'grey area' in international law or would essentially have to be 
considered to fall under the jurisdiction of the respective country where the 
crimes have been committed. However, this is not true. After the international 
war crimes tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo, after the establishment of the ad 
hoe tribunals of The Hague and Arusha and after the conclusion of the process 
of creating an International Criminal Court, today the legal framework of war 
crimes prosecution is in fact quite comprehensive. 
Examining the example of the successful extradition of former Yugoslav 
president Slobodan Milosevic, this paper argues the other than a lack of political 
will there are few obstacles in bringing to justice the worst offenders of 
international law. 
II WAR CRIMES DEFINED 
The perpetrators of atrocities in war contexts are commonly referred to as 
'war criminals'. Yet, although most people would say that war crimes are very 
serious crimes, it is not widely known what exactly the catalogue of those 
crimes incorporates. Different from popular belief and apart from what is 
implied by the wording, a war criminal is not necessarily only a person that 
7 Jane Perlez "War Crimes Prosecutor Vents Frustration" (22 May 1996) The New York Times, 
A8. 
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commits a 'war crime'. In fact, there are four categories of criminal offences in 
international law that are imprecisely referred to as 'war crimes' :8 
A War Crimes 
The first category comprises the actual, technical 'war crimes' committed 
during the conduct of war. The concept of war crimes can be defined as 
violations of the laws and customs of war or international humanitarian law9. 
The term 'war crimes' has no precise meaning since the scope and definition of 
these crimes is dependent on the development of the laws and customs of war. 
Therefore, as the laws of war have a rather dynamic character and the 
international view on these rules and customs changes with time, an exhaustive 
and binding catalogue of war crimes cannot be provided. 10 
The concept of war crime was given the first precise definition in Article 
6(b) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
the Major War Criminals of the European Theater (Nuremberg Charter). 11 The 
article defines war crimes as: 
Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-
treatment or deportation to slave-labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or 
in occupied territory . Murder, or ill-treatment of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas, 
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, 
towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
12 
8 For reasons of readability, the term 'war crime' will be used in this paper, too, referring to all 
types of violations enumerated in this chapter. 
9 Steven R. Ratner Categories of War Crimes in: Roy Gutman (ed) Crimes of War: What the 
Public Should Know (W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1999), available at: 
<http ://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/categories-of-warcrimes. htm I> (last accessed 1 
November 2002). 
10 Alemnesh Gheberhiwot War Crimes Committed by the Eritrean Regime 
<http: //home.swipnet.se/-w-
26522/Home/What_s_New/War _Criminal/War_ Crimes/war_ crimes.htm> (last accessed 1 
November 2002). 
11 However, the concept of war crimes was established before that. The Hague conference of 
1899, provided rules of warfare and rules regarding the treatment of prisoners of war as well as 
conventions on maritime warfare. Offences against these laws and customs of war were 
declared as war crimes. Furthermore, article 27 of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 granted the 
right to the Allied and Associated Powers to Punish the persons who had violated the laws and 
customs of war, and also provided for the arraignment of the German Emperor Kaiser, for 
offence against international morality and sanctity of treaties. 
12 Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, available at 
<http: //www.yale .edu/lawweb/avalon/ imt/proc/ imtconst.htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 
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Additionally, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 have listed a number of 
"grave breaches" which include wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatments, 
and the causing of great suffering or serious injury to body or health. 13 The first 
protocol of 1977 enlarged the list of grave breaches adding various matters. 
Wartime atrocities not prohibited under the Geneva Conventions can be war 
crimes under the customary law rubric of "violations of the laws and customs of 
war". For interstate conflicts states agree that such war crimes include for 
example certain violations of the 1907 Hague Convention and Regulations. 14 
The Statute of the ICC in its article 8(2)(b) 15 lists as war crimes for international 
conflicts not only the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, but also 26 
serious violations of the laws and customs of war, most of which have been 
considered by States as crimes since at least World War II. 16 
As for civil wars international law has fewer rules regulating the conduct of 
conflicts. This area is considered by most States to be part of domestic 
jurisdiction. Consequently, the catalogue of war crimes for civil conflicts is 
considerably shorter than for international conflicts. Additional Protocol II to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1977, containing basic rules for the conduct of 
internal conflicts, has no criminal liability provisions. The relevance of 
customary law war crimes is not as clear with respect to such wars as it is for 
international wars. 
The Statute of the ICTY includes "serious violations of Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions" (addressing civil wars) 17, as well as other basic rules 
on methods of warfare. The tribunal has defined a serious violation as one that 
"[ c ]onstitutes a breach of a rule protecting important values, and involves grave 
13 Steven R. Ratner Categories of War Crimes in : Roy Gutman ( ed) Crimes of War: What the 
Public Should Know (W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1999), available at: 
<http: //www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/categories-of-warcrimes.htm I> (last accessed I 
November 2002). 
14 IV Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) of 18 October 
1907 (entry into force 26 January 1910), available at 
<http: //www.yale .edu/lawweb/avalon/ lawofwar/hague04.htm> (last accessed I November 
2002). 
15 The statute of the ICC is available at <http ://www.un.org/law/ icc/statute/romefra.htm> (last 
accessed I November 2002). 
16 Ratner, above. 
17 See article 2 JCTY statute. 
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consequences for the victim." 18 The catalogue of war crimes embraced in the 
ICTY statute, while shorter than the list of interstate war crimes, covers most of 
the atrocities committed during recent conflicts. 19 
B Crimes against Humanity 
The second legal category is labelled 'crimes against humanity' . Article 6( c) 
of the Nuremberg Charter20 was the first legal instrument to define crimes 
against humanity in positive international law. 21 The Charter established a 
generic category of international crimes to the war crimes addressed in article 
6(b) because it deemed it to go beyond the scope of war crimes. Since then, 
crimes against humanity have acquired their own distinct identity as 
international crimes. 22 
Unlike other international crimes, there as been no specialized international 
convention since then on crimes against humanity. Still, that category of crimes 
has been included in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as several 
other international texts. All of them differ slightly as to their definition of that 
crime and its legal elements.23 
Crimes against humanity are distinguished from domestic crimes by virtue of 
their scope, or their so-called "mass nature." Mass nature is defined by two 
criteria: First, they involve or target a large number of victims and secondly 
they are conducted executing a systematic state policy of "widespread or 
18 ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision on the Defence Motion for lnterlocuto,y Appeal on 
Jurisdiction of2 October 1995 in the Tadic Case (IT-94-I-AR72) (Tadic Jurisdiction 
Decision") , para 94. 
19 Ratner, above. 
2° Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution of the Major War Criminals 
of the European Theatre, available at The Avalon Project at Yale Law School (Nuremberg Trial 
Proceedings, Vol. I) <http: //www.yale.edu/ lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/ imtconst.htm#art6> (last 
accessed I November 2002) . 
2 1 M. Cherif Bassiouni Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal law (Kluwer Law 
International , The Hague, 1999), 41 . 
22 Ibid . 
23 M. CherifBassiouni Crimes Against Humanity in : Roy Gutman (ed) Crimes of War: What the 
Public Should Know (W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1999), available at: 
<http ://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/crimes-against-humanity.html> (last accessed I 
November 2002) . 
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systematic" violations. 24 In addition to having the character of a mass nature, in 
order to qualify under international law as a crime against humanity, it must be 
shown that the groups concerned were targeted for mass murder because of their 
status as a distinct group.25 
To some extent, crimes against humanity overlap with genocide and war 
crimes. However, crimes against humanity are distinguishable from genocide in 
that they do not require a special intent. Crimes against humanity are also 
distinguishable from war crimes in that they not only apply in the context of war 
(when the law of war comes into action, the violation of which constitutes a war 
crime) but also in times of peace. 26 
C Genocide 
The last category of crimes imprecisely combined to the term 'war crimes' is 
genocide. Sometimes deemed to be a mere sub-category of the crimes against 
humanity described above, genocide has to be considered a different class of 
crime, as it involves a very dissimilar mental element. Scholars and practitioners 
of international law often regard genocide as the most heinous international 
crime.27 It is considered a crime on a different scale and both the gravest and the 
greatest of the crimes against humanity.28 
War crimes had been defined before, but the crime of genocide required a 
separate definition as this was believed to be 'not only a crime against the rules 
of war, but a crime against humanity itself affecting not just the individual or 
nation in question, but humanity as a whole. 29 
24 The Cambodian Genocide Program at Yale University Crimes Against Humanity (Definition) 
<http: //www.yale.edu/cgp/dccam/hcrimes.htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 25 M. CherifBassiouni Crimes Against Humanity in: Roy Gutman (ed) Crimes of War: What the 
Public Should Know (W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1999), available at: 
<http: //www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/crimes-against-humanity.html> (last accessed I 
November 2002). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law - Beyond the Nuremberg legacy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997), 24. 28 Patrick G. Daniels The Crime of Genocide in: A lain Destexhe (ed) Rwanda and Genocide in 
the Twentieth Century (New York University Press, NY, 1995), I. 
29 Daniels, above, 1-2. 
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Unlike other crimes against humanity, genocide has been authoritatively 
coded in a single, widely accepted legal instrument. 30 The international legal 
definition of the crime of genocide is found in the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. 31 After stating in article I that 
genocide is a crime under international law, the Convention lays down a 
definition of the crime. Article II of the convention describes two elements of 
the crime of genocide: First, a mental element (intent requirement), meaning the 
"intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such", and secondly a physical element which includes five acts 
described in sections a, b, c, d and e. A crime must include both elements to be 
called "genocide." Article II goes on to enumerate five punishable forms of the 
crime of genocide: genocide, conspiracy, incitement, attempt and complicity. 32 
D Aggression 
The 2002 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in its article 5( d) 
also features the crime of aggression. 33 However, while war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide are extensively defined in the subsequent 
articles34, aggression lacks a clear definition. 
III LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The legal framework for trying international war criminals has been put into 
place with various human rights treaties: namely, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions. In 
addition, several principles of war crimes prosecution are considered to be part 
of the jus cogens. The notion of ajus cogens is derived from the Natural Law 
concept that certain norms exist from which no state may ever deviate. 35 Hence, 
30 Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
international law - Beyond the Nuremberg l egacy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997), 24. 31 UN General Assembly, Official Records, General Assembly Resolution 95 (I), 11 December 
1946. 
32 Prevent Genocide International The Legal Definition of Genocide 
<http: //www.preventgenocide.org/genocide/officialtext.htrn> (last accessed I November 2002). 33 See: article S(d) ICC Statute, available at <http: //www.un.org/ law/ icc/statute/romefra.htm> 
(last accessed I November 2002). 
34 Article 6 ICC Statute (Genocide), article 7 (Crimes Against Humanity) and article 8 (War 
Crimes). 
35 Carin Kahgan Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right to Self-Defense 3 ILSA J. lnt'I & Comp. L 
(Vol. 3, No . 3, Spring 1997), 767, 769. 
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while some of the rules given below are not laid down in acts or treaties, they 
are still believed to have universal validity. 
A Jurisdiction 
The legislative authority to proscribe certain acts by law is not necessarily 
coupled with the judicial authority to punish violators of the law. The question 
of the criminality of wartime atrocities is distinguishable from the question of 
which courts have jurisdiction to try those accused of these offences.36 
Since the rules of war are part of international law, no nation can unilaterally 
change them. No legislature can declare that something which is considered to 
constitute a war crime is permitted to own nationals or forces. 37 The right to try 
an enemy war crime suspect has been uncontested throughout the centuries. In 
fact, since the rules of war are international law, such suspects may be tried and 
punished even by a nation that has not passed any legislation for such 
procedures at all. The Nuremberg charter and the judgment of the Nuremberg 
tribunal furthermore established that war crimes have no particular geographic 
location. Thus, any state has jurisdiction to put offenders of war crimes on trial, 
even though they are nationals of another state, for committing crimes in the 
territory of another state. 38 
The crimes in question here are considered to be part of jus cogens. They 
constitute a non-derogable rule of international law.39 As a result, these rules are 
subject to universal jurisdiction - a principle that has been recognized under 
international law since the establishment of the International Military Tribunal 
of Nuremberg. Any state has the ability to exercise universal jurisdiction over 
36 Theodor Meron international Criminalization of Internal Atrocities 89 Am . J. Int'I. L. 554, 
561. 
37 John H. E. Fried War Crimes (WW!l Commemoration) 
<http: //gi .grolier.com/wwi i/wwii_ warcrimes.htm I> (last accessed l November 2002). 38 Michael A. Meyer and Hilaire McCoubrey (eds) Reflections on law and Armed Conflict -
The Selected Works on the Laws of War by the Late Professor Colonel G.1.A .D. Draper, OBE 
(Kluver Law International , The Hague/London/ Boston, 1998), 98. 
39 M. CherifBassiouni Crimes Against Humanity in : Roy Gutman (ed) Crimes of War: What the 
Public Should Know (W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1999), available at: 
<http ://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/crimes-against-humanity.html> (last accessed 1 
November 2002). 
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crimes against humanity and other crimes under international law.40 All states 
can exercise their jurisdiction in prosecuting a perpetrator irrespective of where 
the crime was committed. Furthermore, all states are under obligation to 
prosecute and punish war crimes and to cooperate in the detection, arrest and 
punishment as well as the extradition of persons implicated.41 
The statutes of the international war crimes tribunals explicitly lay down the 
respective tribunals scope of jurisdiction. The same is true for the International 
Criminal Court. 
B Personal Responsibility 
Ever since the Nuremberg trials, a common defence for alleged war criminal 
has been the excuse of 'just obeying orders'. This defence has always been 
dismissed as all tribunals assume personal responsibility for acts committed, 
whether they were based on orders or not. A claim of superior orders cannot 
serve as a defence against an allegation of grave breaches or other serious 
violations of international law.42 However, while it is generally easy to find the 
actual perpetrators guilty, the people pulling the strings are a lot harder to bring 
to justice. It is generally easier to convict middle-level personnel for war crimes 
than a commander or a former head of state.43 Middle-level personnel have 
either participated in the actual crimes themselves, given the orders to commit 
the crimes, or looked the other way when the crimes were committed.44 In 
contrast, people in the higher ranks of the command chain increasingly distance 
themselves from specific events in the field by vague delegation to their field 
commanders.45 
40 Amnesty International Pinochet -The Absence of Immunity for Crimes Against Humanity: 
Amnesty International Submits Case to the House of lords (3 November 1999) 
<http://web.amnesty.org/ai. nsf/Index/EU R450221998?0penDocument&of=CO UNTRJES%5C 
UK> (last accessed 1 November 2002). 
41 Amnesty International, above. 
42 Nomi Bar-Yaacov Command Responsibility in: Roy Gutman (ed) Crimes of War: What the 
Public Should Know (W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1999), available at: 
<http: //www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/command-respon.html> (last accessed I November 
2002). 
43 David Scheffer (former US Ambassador at Large for War Crimes) in a 30 August 200 I PBS 
interview (NewsHour: Who is a War Criminal), 
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/yugos lavia/j u ly-decO 1 /criminal_ 8-30 .htm I> (last 
accessed I November 2002). 
44 Sophia Piliouras International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Milosevic 's Trial 18 
NYLS J. Hum. R. 515, 518. 
45 Pi I iouras, above, 518-519. 
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However, even those giving orders without ever personally participating in 
their execution can be punished for war crimes. The culpability of superiors for 
atrocities that their subordinates commit is known as command responsibility. It 
is the legal and logical concomitant of the defence of 'obedience to superior 
orders ' .46 Although the concept was originally adapted from military law, it 
now also includes the responsibility of political leaders and other civil 
authorities for violations of international law committed by persons under their 
direct authority. There are two forms of command responsibility. The first is 
direct responsibility for unlawful orders. Any official authorizing acts that can 
be considered as war crimes is individually responsible for these acts, whether 
or not the superior personally participates in the atrocity or has subordinates 
c: · 47 per1orm 1t. 
The other form of command responsibility is an imputed responsibility for 
crimes of subordinates where those crimes are not based on direct orders. In this 
case responsibility depends on whether the superior had notice of the 
subordinates' atrocities. This can be either direct notice during or immediately 
after the perpetration of the crimes, or even constructive notice, where the 
offences were so numerous or notorious that a reasonable person could come to 
no other conclusion than that the superior must have known of their 
commission, but displayed such serious personal dereliction as to constitute 
wilful and wanton disregard of the possible consequences.48 The failure of the 
superior to take appropriate measures to control the subordinates under his 
command and prevent atrocities and the failure to punish offenders are further 
elements of command responsibility. 49 
Command responsibility is a part of customary international law. The origins 
of the concept can be traced back to at least 500 B.C., when Sun Tzu referred to 
46 M. Cherif Bassiouni Crimes Against Humanity in international Criminal law (2"d Ed., 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/ Boston, I 999), 420 . 
47 Bassiouni, above, 4 I 9. 
48 Bassiouni, above, 4 I 9-420; Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams Accountability for Human 
Rights Atrocities in International law - Beyond the Nuremberg legacy (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1997), 119-120; Tokyo Tribunal: Yamashita Trial, IV WCR 35 as confirmed by GP I, 
Art. 86, para 2. 
49 Bassiouni , above, 422. 
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it in his The Art of War. 50 The doctrine has become such an accepted feature of 
international and national criminal law, through usage and inclusion in treaties, 
that it is now a universally recognized precept. 51 It is also an explicit feature of 
many treaties. Article 86 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions states: 
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a 
subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal disciplinary responsibility as the 
case may be if they knew, or had information which would have enabled them to conclude 
in the circumstances at the time that he was committing or was going to commit such a 
breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or 
52 repress the breach. 
The principle of command responsibility is also a feature of all statutes of 
modern war crimes tribunals . According to article 7 of the ICTY statute, the 
direct perpetrator of a crime as well as the military or political leaders who 
ordered that crime, can be prosecuted. Paragraph 3 adds: 
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was 
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he 
knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had 
done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
53 
This phrase is mirrored the 1998 ICC statute. Under its article 28 
(Responsibility of Commanders and other Superiors), a military commander is 
liable for crimes that he "knew or should have known" about under 
circumstances at the time, and only for those crimes committed by forces under 
his "effective command and control." He is liable if he "failed to take all 
necessary and reasonable measures" to prevent and repress such crimes that 
50 ICTY Bulletin No. 15/16, available at <http://www.un.org/icty/BL/I 5art3e.htm> (last 
accessed I November 2002). 
51 William H. Parks Command Responsibility/or War Crimes 62 Mil. L. Rev. ,I ,1-2. 
52 Nomi Bar-Yaacov Command Responsibility in: Roy Gutman (ed) Crimes of War: What the 
Public Should Know (W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1999), available at: 
<http: //www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/command-respon.html> (last accessed I November 
2002). 
53 Article 7(3) ICTY statute. 
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subordinates "were committing or about to commit" or for failing to report such 
crimes to proper authorities. 54 
Given that the appropriate evidence can be presented, the principle of 
command responsibility is valid for every single person involved at any level in 
planning, ordering and committing war crimes, including (former) heads of 
states. There is a long established fundamental rule of international law that 
heads of state do not enjoy immunity for crimes against humanity. Under 
international law heads of state and government officials are not immune from 
. . l . 55 cnmma prosecution. 
The fact that military or political superiors are deemed responsible for the 
crimes of their subordinates does not in turn absolve those inferiors of their 
individual responsibility. The doctrine of superior orders is not a defence to 
personal criminal liability. However, it may be used to mitigate the sentence of 
a subordinate who acted pursuant to the order. Article 7 ( 4) of the I CTY statute 
states: 
The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a 
superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered m 
mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 
Thus, no perpetrator can claim the "defence of obedience to superior orders" 
and that no statute of limitation contained in the laws of any state can apply. No 
one is immune from prosecution for such crimes, even a head of State.56 The 
doctrine of command responsibility imposes criminal liability for wartime 
atrocities upon the actual perpetrators (whether or not obeying orders) and the 
54 Nomi Bar-Yaacov Command Responsibility in: Roy Gutman (ed) Crimes of War: What the 
Public Should Know (W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1999), available at: 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/command-respon.html> (last accessed 1 November 2002). 55 Amnesty International Pinochet -The Absence of Immunity for Crimes Against Humanity: 
Amnesty International Submits Case to the House of lords (3 November I 999) 
<http:! /web .amnesty .org/ai . nsf/1 ndex/EU R450221998?0pen Document&of=COUNTRIES%5C 
UK> (last accessed I November 2002). 
56 M. CherifBassiouni Crimes Against Humanity in : Roy Gutman (ed) Crimes of War: What the 
Public Should Know (W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1999), available at: 
<http ://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/crimes-against-humanity.html> (last accessed 1 
November 2002). 
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ones that did give these orders or deliberately ignored the perpetration of these 
acts. 
C The Principle of Legality 
Event though on an international level the standards and legal definitions of 
crimes under international law are becoming more and more comprehensive -
especially with the adoption of the ICC statute - they still lack the preciseness 
and universal validity of common domestic crimes. This absence of clear 
standards or precedents is the reason why war crimes prosecutions are often 
considered to at least have the potential to offend the principles of nullum 
crimen sine lege (no crime without law) and nullurn poena sine lege (no 
punishment without law).57 This concept is often referred to as the 'principle of 
legality ' . 58 
The prohibition on assigning guilt for acts not considered as crimes when 
committed is a fundamental precept in international and domestic law. Its notion 
finds different forms in various legal contexts. The principle of nullurn crimen 
includes - in addition to the prohibition of legislation having retrospective effect 
- also the principle of certainty, that is, for example, the requirement of a 
distinct definition of the facts constituting an offence 
As applied in the field of international law, the principle nullum crirnen sine 
lege received its first interpretation in the opinion of the International Military 
Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1946, where the defendants asserted that the charges 
against them were not crimes when (allegedly) committed. Evading a distinction 
between violations of international law and individual responsibility the tribunal 
stated: 
In the first place, it is to be observed that the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a 
limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust 
to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighbouring 
states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must 
57 Timothy L.H . McCormack and Gerry Simpson (eds) The Law of War Crimes - National and 
International Approaches (Kluver Law International , The Hague/London/Boston, 1997), 12. 58 Ibid . 
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know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be 
unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished .
59 
However, today most scholars agree that the principle of nulla crimen sine 
lege, which exists in most national legal systems, is not applicable in the same 
strict sense in international criminal law because of the particularities of the 
discipline.60 Unlike the domestic criminal law, much of the international 
criminal law is not codified in treaties or in any other code. As a result, the law 
required for criminality under the nullum crirnen sine lege maxim at the 
international level includes not merely conventional law but also customary 
law. 61 
Two human rights treaties - the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)62 and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)63 -
allow exceptions to the nullurn crimen sine lege in relation to war crimes trials. 
This has led many to think that the principle differs from its national corollaries 
when crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are 
involved. Judgments, laws and charters relating to war crimes trials conducted 
after the Second World War demonstrate that there is a more liberal 
understanding and application of the nullurn crimen sine lege principle at 
international level. 64 
The two modern war crimes tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR, do not 
encapsulate the nullurn crirnen sine lege in a statutory provision, but consider it 
a "general principle of law". The ICTY applies the principle nullurn crimen sine 
59 The Maza! Library Nuremberg Military Tribunal Records (Volume III , page 975), available at 
<http: //www.mazal.org/archive/nmt/03/N MT03-T0975 .htm> (last accessed 1 November 2002); 
22 IMT Trials, 462. 
60 See for example Stefan Glaser Nullum Crimen Sine Lege 24 J. Comp. Legis . & Int'I L. 29. 61 Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International l aw - Beyond the Nuremberg l egacy (Clarendon Press, Oxford , 1997), 20. 62 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G .A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N . GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 52 , U.N . Doc. N 6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
63 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 
4 November 1950 - (ETS No.5) and (STE No. 5), completed by Protocol No. 2 (ETS No. 44) of 
6 May 1963 and amended by Protocol No. 3 (ETS No. 45) of 6 May 1963, Protocol No. 5 (ETS 
No. 55) of 20 January 1966 and Protocol No. 8 (ETS No. 118) of 19 March 1985. 64 Machteld Boot Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court: Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes (Ph.D. 
Dissertation at Tilburg University, NL, 6 March 2002) . 
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as customary international law. 65 Upon creating the tribunal, the Secretary-
General believed application of the principle required the ICTY to apply rules 
of international humanitarian law, which were beyond any doubt part of 
customary law. This way the problem of adherence of some but not all States to 
specific conventions would not arise.66 As the Report of the Secretary-General 
stated in paragraph 29, the Security Council would not be creating or purporting 
to legislate. Instead, the ICTY would simply have the task of applying existing 
international humanitarian law.67 In the Tadic Case the Trial Chamber said the 
following: 
The Trial Chamber finds that common Article 3 [of the Geneva Conventions] imposes 
obligations that are within the subject-matter jurisdiction of [the ICTY] because those 
obligations are a part of customary international law. ( .. . ) Imposing criminal responsibility 
upon individuals for these violations does not violate the principle of null um crimen sine 
68 
lege. 
However, this has met strong criticism. In fact, the practice of the ad hoe 
tribunals to determine and apply customary international law, a concept that is 
not clearly defined in international law, seems to contravene the requirements of 
specificity and certainty in the law.69 The problem may be solved with the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court. Unlike the ICTY, the ICC is 
completely bound to its statute. Interpretation of customary international law is 
of secondary importance.70 The ICC Statute also comprises the requirement of 
strict construction that prohibits any extension of definitions by analogy. Not 
only must the description of conduct be interpreted in a strict sense, the 
principle also requires the Court to strictly construe the elements that make an 
offence a war crime. Given the ICC's comprehensive statute, most international 
65 ICTY Bulletin No. 9/10 ICTY!iCTR Twin Tribunals 
<http://www.un.org/ icty/BL/09artle.htm> (last accessed 1 November 2002). 
66 Scott T. Johnson On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the international 
Criminal Tribunal/or the Former Yugoslavia (ICDAA Reports/ International Legal 
Perspectives 1999) <http://www.hri.ca/partners/aiad-icdaa/reports/Yugo.htm> (last accessed 1 
November 2002). 
67Johnson, above . 
68 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a.k.a. "Dute", Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 . 
69 Machteld Boot Nullum Crimen Cine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the 
international Criminal Court: Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes (Ph.D. 
Dissertation at Tilburg University, NL, 6 March 2002). 
70 See article 21 (b) of the ICC Statute. 
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crimes committed after its into-force-coming will fall under the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal. The assertion that specific behaviour did not constitute a criminal 
offence at the time it was committed will not be valid anymore. After the 
Nuremberg Tribunals and after the establishment of the ICC, perpetrators of war 
crimes can hardly claim anymore that they were not aware of the fact that 
committing atrocities is a crime under international law, which engages 
individual responsibility .71 
IV WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 
Just like conventional criminal offences, war crimes are supposed to be 
judged by the regular criminal courts in the country where the crime has been 
committed. However, it seems to be a common characteristic of war crime 
scenarios that the state concerned is not capable, or - more likely - not willing 
to prosecute the offenders because of their political or military power, their 
popularity amongst the people or their extensive personal relationships with 
those in office. This is where international tribunals come into play. As war 
crimes constitute crimes against the whole humanity, war criminals can be put 
on trial virtually anywhere. 
A The History of War Crimes Tribunals 
The modern precedents for international criminal liability for gross violations 
of international law were established by the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after 
the Second World War.72 Here, the prosecution for the first time imposed 
international criminal liability for genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
h · d · 73 umamty, an aggressive war. 
The Nuremberg trial of leading personalities of the Third Reich before the 
International Military Tribunal74 was the largest ad hoe war crimes tribunal the 
world had seen to date . Following the Nazi atrocities of World War II , the 
71 Ingrid Detter The l aw of War (2"d Edition, Cambridge Uni versity Press, Cambridge 2000), 
425 . 
72James Blount Griffin A Predictive Framework for the Effectiveness of International Criminal 
Tribunals <http://law.vanderbilt. edu/j ournal/vo l342/griffin .html> (last accessed I November 
2002). 
73 M. Cherif Bassiouni Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal law (Kluwer Law 
International , The Hague, 1999), 525. 
74 The tribunal held trials from 20 November 1945 to I October I 946. 
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tribunal was established and functioned pursuant to an agreement by 
representatives of the Allied Powers (United States, Britain, France and the 
USSR) and formally adhered to also by 19 other nations. Of the 24 former 
leading Nazis indicted, 22 were tried, one of the defendants committed suicide 
before judgment and the other was not tried for medical reasons. Death 
sentences were imposed on 12 defendants, three were given life imprisonment 
and four lesser prison sentences, and three were acquitted.75 After the main trial 
was completed, 185 other leading German personalities were indicted before 12 
tribunals, composed exclusively of United States judges, at Nuremberg under a 
law issued by the Allied Control Council for Germany. The unique 
circumstances of the collapse of Nazi Germany in 1945 resulted in tremendous 
success for the prosecutors of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
and broad international support for the verdicts. 76 
The Tokyo international tribunal was established on 19 January 1946 by U.S. 
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers. 77 The law applied by it was very similar to that applied by the 
Nuremberg tribunal. The trial lasted from May 1946 to November 1948. Of the 
25 defendants brought to trial, 7 were given the death sentence, 16 were 
sentenced to life imprisonment and 2 to other prison terms. 78 
The Tokyo Tribunal does not enJOY the prestige and respect of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal. It demonstrates how political realities influence or even 
dictate the effectiveness of the enforcement of international criminal law. 79 The 
Tokyo Tribunal, in retrospect, does not seem as just, and therefore is seldom 
cited as a landmark in international criminal law. 80 The tribunal's credibility 
75 OLG Nuremberg (Higher Superior Court of Nuremberg) International Military Tribunal: The 
Nuremberg War-Crimes Trial (/945/46) <http: //www.justiz.bayern.de/olgn/ imte.htm> (last 
accessed I November 2002). 
76 Garry J. Bass International law: War Crimes and the limits of Legalism 97 Mich. L. Rev. 
2103. 
77 Bassiouni , above, 525. 
78 CNN Law Center Key Tribunals (7 December 200 I), 
<http: //www.cnn.com/200 I/LA W/ 12/06/ inv.tribunals.timeline> (last accessed I November 
2002), at l 946. 
79 James Blount Griffin A Predictive Framework for the Effectiveness of international Criminal 
Tribunals <http:// law.vanderbilt.edu/journal/vol342/griffin.html> (last accessed I November 
2002). 
so Ibid. 
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was seriously undermined by the selective enforcement of its provisions and by 
the failure to employ the same standards to those Allied personnel who had 
committed the same atrocities. 81 The same is true (to a lesser extent) for the 
Nuremberg tribunal. 
B From Nuremberg to The Hague and Arusha 
After the tribunals dealing with World War II atrocities82 no international 
criminal court sat for more than forty years. 83 Despite a growing body of 
international human rights law building on the precedents set at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo and ongoing crimes against humanity in many places all over the world 
such as Cambodia and Iraq, the United Nations did not establish another 
international criminal court until atrocities in the Balkans occurred. Eventually, 
after some 100,000 people had been killed, the United Nations Security Council 
created the ICTY84 in May 1993.85 Less than a year later, Rwanda erupted in 
genocidal violence after President Habyarimana was assassinated, resulting in 
the deaths of about 800,000 people. 86 In reaction to the atrocities committed in 
Rwanda, the Security Council created the ICTR at the end of 1994. 
C The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is the first 
international war crimes tribunal since the immediate aftermath of World War II 
(Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals) .87 Located in The Hague, The Netherlands, 
the actual tribunal is composed of 832 staff from 68 countries. 88 
81 M. Cherif Bassiouni Crimes Against Humanity in international Criminal law (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1999), 525-526. 
82 The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were the main trials but not the only ones: War crimes 
tribunals, involving several thousand suspects, were held in Germany until 1963. In 1961 , Israel 
tried and subsequently executed Adolf Eichmann, who had been abducted from Argentina. 
83 Vincent M. Creta The Search for Justice in the Former Yugoslavia and Beyond: Analyzing 
the Rights of the Accused Under the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 20 Hous. J. lnt' I L. 381, 382. 
84 Jntemational Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 , 
UN Doc. S/25704, Annex (1993). 
85 Sean D. Murphy Progress and Jurisprudence of the international Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 93 Am. 1. lnt'I. L. 57, 57. 
86 Paul J. Magnarella, Some Milestones and Achievements at the international Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda: The 1998 Kambanda and Akayesu Cases, 11 Fla. J. Int'l. L. 517, 518. 
87 Gary Jonathan Bass Stay the Hand of Vengeance - The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton/Oxford, 2000), 206. 
88 ICTY The iCTY at a Glance (General Information) 
<http: //www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 
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At present, there are 76 published indictments and an unknown number of 
sealed indictments. 55 persons are currently in proceedings before the tribunal. 
44 of the accused are in custody at the ICTY's detention unit in The 
Netherlands. Eleven detainees have been provisionally released, 21 are still at 
large, including the two main figures of the war (next to Slobodan Milosevic), 
former president of the Serb Democratic Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Radovan Karadzic and former Commander of Serb Troops in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, General Ratko Mladic. 89 
The ICTY's website states the tribunal's self-conception, declaring that "in 
harmony with the purpose of its founding resolution, the ICTY's mission is 
fourfold: 
• to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for violations of 
international humanitarian law 
• to render justice to the victims 
• to deter further crimes 
• to contribute to the restoration of peace by promoting reconciliation in 
the former Yugoslavia."90 
The process of implementing a tribunal began with the adoption of 13 
Security Council resolutions and six statements within two months in 1993 . 
These declared the situation in the former Yugoslavia was a breach of 
international peace and security, expressed concern over violations of 
international law in the region and affirmed individual responsibility for such 
violations. 
By its Resolution 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992, the Security Council created 
a commission of experts to examine these violations of international law.91 The 
89 Figures as of 3 October 2002 - ICTY The ICTY at a Glance (List of Public Indictments) 
<http ://www.un.org/ icty/glance/index .htm> (last accessed l November 2002). 
90 ICTY The JCTY at a Glance (General Information) 
<http://www.un.org/icty/g lance/ index. htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 
91 See: Letter dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security 
Council (S/ 1994/674), available at <http ://www.ess .uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/lntr.htm> (last 
accessed I November 2002); Geoffrey Robertson Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for 
Global Justice (Penguin Books, London, UK, 1999), 289. 
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comm1ss10n concluded in two interim reports9
2 that senous violations of 
international humanitarian law were indeed taking place and recommended the 
creation of an ad hoe international tribunal. In the aftermath of the commission's 
first report, on 11 February 1993 , the Council declared that the violations of 
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia indeed constituted a 
threat to international peace and security, and decided to establish an 
international tribunal to address them. 
93 
On 3 May 1993, the Secretary-General's report set forth a draft statute for an 
ad hoe international tribunal and took the view that the Security Council should 
establish the tribunal by resolution. 
On 25 May 1993, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed 
Resolution 827 (1993)94, creating the tribunal under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter and adopting the draft statute in the Secretary-General's 
report95 . The tribunal was established: 
[b]elieving that the establishment of an international tribunal and the prosecution of 
persons responsible for the above-mentioned violations of international humanitarian law 
will contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively redressed .
96 
The ICTY was created in the aftermath of evidence of horrendous war and 
humanitarian crimes in that conflict, in particular, genocide, numerous atrocities 
and ethnic cleansing perpetrated mainly by Bosnian Serbs (regular army as well 
as several paramilitary groups) against Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
92 Interim Report (S/25274) of 9 February 1993 and Interim Report (S/26545) of 5 October 
1993. 
93 Timothy L.H . McCormack and Gerry Simpson (eds) The Law of War Crimes - National and 
International Approaches (Kluver Law International, The Hague/London/Boston, 1997), 195. 
94 UN Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), adopted 25 May 1993, (S/RES/827 (1993)), 
available at <http://www.un.org/ icty/basic/statut/S-RES-827 _93 .htm> (last accessed I 
November 2002). 
95 Report of the Secretary-General (S/25704 and Add. I) . 
96 Introduction to Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) (S/RES/827). 
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The jurisdiction of the tribunal is contained in article 1 of the statute.
97 This 
article states that the ICTY 
[s]hall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 
1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute. 
The statute also establishes individual criminal responsibility for four 
clusters of offences.98 These offences are: grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions (article 2), violations of the laws or customs of war (article 3), 
genocide (article 4), and crimes against humanity (article 5). 
It is interesting to note, however, that the Geneva Conventions traditionally 
do only apply to international conflicts, but not to internal conflicts. In the 
ICTY decision of The Prosecutor v Dusco Tadic
99 the majority of the Appeal 
Chamber held that although the Geneva Conventions only impose mandatory 
universal jurisdiction for grave breaches committed in an international conflict, 
they acknowledge that the status of current international humanitarian law on 
the applicability of grave breaches may very well be in a state of flux and is 
perhaps in the process of changing from the traditional view. 
This dichotomy between international and internal conflict is further 
strengthened when the court in the Tadic Case noted the view of the United 
States. The U.S. stated that grave breaches apply to armed conflicts of a non-
international character as well as those of an international character; however, 
there is little discussion as to the reason why. '
00 The reason for this seems to be 
a new interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, which emphasise a personal 
criminal responsibility for acts which constitute grave breaches of the 
conventions even when committed in the course of an internal armed conflict. 
97 Amended Statute of the lCTY (adopted 25 May 1993), available at 
<http ://www.un.org/ icty/basic/statut/statute.htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 
98 M. Cherif Bassiouni Background on the War Crimes Tribunal 
<http: //www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontl ine/shows/karadzic/trial/background.htm I> (last 
accessed 1 November 2002). 
99 JCTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a.k.a "Dute", Case No. IT-94-1-AR72. 
100 Strangely enough, when accused of maltreating alleged prisoners of war from the 
Afghanistan conflict at Camp X-Ray, Guantanomo Bay, Cuba, U.S. Secretary of State Donald 
This is supported by the fact that Tadic was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment 
for his individual criminal responsibility on six counts of grave breaches of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, without taking into account the question whether the 
war in the former Yugoslavia was considered to be an internal or an 
international conflict. 
Because the ICTY was created by the Security Council, all member states are 
bound by that decision. Its statute imposes a duty on all members of the United 
Nations to cooperate with its investigations and arrests.
101 Furthermore, as the 
ICTY was created under Chapter VII, the Security Council can use sanctions to 
enforce the decisions of the tribunal. 
102 
D The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
The history of the Rwanda Tribunal mirrors that of the Yugoslavia Tribunal 
in many respects, as the United Nations' member states took action after a 
tragedy had already unfolded. Like the ICTY, the Arusha tribunal took years to 
begin its first trial, and despite setting some impressive precedents, only a 
handful of the defendants have been prosecuted.
103 Those convicted include 
Jean Kambanda, the Prime Minister of the Rwandan Government during the 
genocide, who was the first head of Government to be convicted for 
"d 104 genoc1 e. 
The statute of the ICTR
105 resembles the ICTY-statute considerably. Article 
2 (Genocide), article 3 (Crimes against Humanity) and article 4 (Violations of 
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II) 
establish the ICTR's power to those certain types of crimes ( only). The 
Rumsfeld refused to acknowledge the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to conflicts of 
not-international scale. 
101 Jelena Pejic Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in international 
law 60 Alb. L. Rev. 841, 843-44. 
102 M. Cherif Bassiouni Background on the War Crimes Tribunal 
<http: //www. p bs. org/wgb h/pages/fron tl ine/shows/karadz i c/trial/background. h tm I> ( last 
accessed l November 2002). 
103 Payam Akhavan, The international Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and 
Pragmatics of Punishment 90 Am. J. Jnt'I L. 501; Paul J. Magnarella, Expanding the Frontiers 
of Humanitarian law: The international Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 9 Fla. J. Int'I L. 421. 
104 ICTR General information I Achievements of the ICTR <http: //www.ictr.org> (last accessed 
I November 2002). 
105 Statute of the ICTR (adopted 8 November 1994), available at 
<http: //www.un.org/ ictr/statute.html> (last accessed I November 2002). 
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definition of genocide in article 2 is identical to article 4 of the ICTY statute. So 
is the wording of article 3 of the ICTR statute and article 5 of the CTY statute. 
The only major difference between the two statutes is article 4 of the ICTR 
Statute, which discusses Violations of article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and 
of Additional Protocol II. The ICTR Statute does differ in this regard reflecting 
the conflict's particular circumstances. 
E The International Criminal Court 
The ICTY and ICTR, despite their flaws , provided the impetus for the 
creation of a permanent international criminal court. 106 Ever since the 
Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals, the UN has envisaged the creation of an 
International Criminal Court to try the gravest crimes. The need for 
international criminal justice has been highlighted recently by cases such as that 
of Chile's General Augusto Pinochet, Sierra Leone's Foday Sankoh and the 
military generals in Indonesia. 
On 1 July 2002, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court entered 
into force , triggering the jurisdiction of the first permanent international court 
capable of trying persons who commit serious violations of international law, 
namely war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and the newly created 
but yet to be defined 107 crime of aggression.108 Unlike the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), whose jurisdiction is restricted to States, the ICC has the capacity 
to indict individuals.109 
The statute of the ICC was adopted and opened for signature and ratification 
at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Rome Conference) 17 July 
1998. 11 0 During a historic ceremony on 11 April 2002, 10 states simultaneously 
deposited their instruments of ratification, crossing the threshold of the 60 
106 David J. Scheffer Developments in international Justice: The U.S. and the JCC 93 Am. J. 
lnt'l. L. 12, 13 . 
107 The lack of a definition for ' aggression ' was one of the main arguments brought forward by 
the United States in justifying the U.S. refusal to ratify the Rome Statute. 
108 See: article 5(a) - (d) ICC Statute, available at 
<http://www.un .org/law/ icc/statute/romefra.htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 
109 Coalition for the JCC (CICC) /CC Update (30th Edition, October 2002) 
<http://www.iccnow.org/htm l/ICCUpdate30Edfina1.doc> (last accessed I November 2002). 
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ratifications necessary for entry into force of the Rome Statute, which 
subsequently occurred on 1 July 2002.111 
The statute, having its own text as governing law, avoids the ex post facto 
and nulla crimen sine lege questions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. 
However, the courts jurisdiction is limited to those crimes committed after the 
entry into force of its statute on 1 July 2002.Crimes committed before that 
threshold date can not be prosecuted by the ICC. 
To date, 139 states have become signatory to the Rome Statute. Of those, 81 
have already ratified it, including New Zealand which ratified the statute on 7 
September 2000. 112 However, with the defiant refusal of the United States to 
support the ICC and to become signatory to its statute and its attempts to 
undermine the courts jurisdiction by urging states to sign impunity 
agreements 113 before the court has actually taken up its work, it is not clear 
whether the court will be able to live up to the great expectations for a 
permanent criminal court that the international community has been thinking 
about for so long. 
F The Legal Basis for Ad Hoe Tribunals 
One of the major advantages of the permanent ICC will be the fact that it can 
hardly be perceived to represent "victors' justice", a suspicion often raised in 
regard to ad hoe tribunals. These tribunals are UN institutions, created by the 
Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the case of the 
ICTY, the UN obviously first considered to base the tribunal on a treaty, but this 
approach was then abandoned as being too long and arduous given the urgency 
d . h . UN I . 114 expresse m t e respective reso utions. 
11 0 The I CC statute was adopted by a vote of 120 to 7, with 21 abstentions. 
111 United Nations /CC/ General/Overview of the ICC 
<http ://www.un.org/ law/ icc/general/overview.htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 
11 2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Status of Ratification (chart), available at 
<http://untreaty .un .org/EN GLISH/bi ble/engl ish internetbib le/partl/chapter XV III/treaty I O .asp#N 
5> (last accessed I November 2002). 
11 3 To date the USA has signed 13 impunity agreements, in most cases with foreign ministers of 
states that are vulnerable to US pressure. Reportedly, many of those that signed were threatened 
with withdrawal of US military and other assistance. However, apparently not a single one of 
these agreements has been ratified by parliament. 
114 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 
808 ( 1993) (S/25704), para 20. 
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Thus, the authority to create the tribunal was predicated on Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. Following the wording of the Charter, the ICTY was labelled 
as a 
[m]easure to maintain or restore international peace and security, following the requisite 
determination of the existence of a threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of 
. 115 
aggression. 
However, the jurisdiction of these tribunals has not been undisputed. In one 
of his few pertinent comments, during the early stages of the trial, Milosevic 
flatly refuses to accept the jurisdiction of the ICTY, branding it as a political 
tool designed to impose "victor's justice." This objection cannot be dismissed as 
the mere ranting of a madman - Milosevic's arguments have been taken up by a 
number of well-known lawyers, including former U.S. attorney general Ramsay 
Clark, who acted as legal council for Milosevic at the time. 
Some scholars seem to agree with Milosevic to a certain extent on this point. 
The ICTY sometimes is deemed to have a somewhat questionable derivation, as 
it was created by the UN Security Council, rather than the General Assembly, 
especially since the same Security Council had imposed sanctions on Serbia 
before, and three of the Council's permanent members had led the earlier 
bombing campaign. Thus, the ICTY has been burdened with a suspicion of 
"victor's justice". It is pointed out that, while the General Assembly endorsed 
the establishment of the ICTY by nominating the judges, by approving the 
budget and by passing resolutions in support of the tribunal, such consent does 
not permit states to voice their objections relating to the structure of the tribunal, 
the scope of its jurisdiction, the language of the statute, its procedure and 
evidence rules or the sanction powers. 116 Joshua M. Koran thus reasons that 
[a]ccordingly, the manner in which the Tribunal was established greatly diminishes the 
precedential value of this Tribunal as a representative consensus on the necessity and 
115 Report of the Secretary General , above, paras 19 and 23. 
116 Joshua M. Koran An Analysis of the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia 5 ILSA J. lnt'l & Comp. L (Vol. 5, No. I, Fall 1998), 43, 
48. 
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function of an international criminal court.
117 
In fact, article 22 of the UN Charter states that it is the General Assembly's 
authority to "establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the 
performance of its functions". However, it is doubtful if a war crimes tribunal 
really could be seen as a subsidiary organ to the General Assembly. 
In contrast, articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter (the prov1s10ns the 
establishment of the tribunal was ultimately based on) 118 seem much more 
relevant in the context of the persecution of war crimes. Article 41 provides: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are 
to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the 
United Nations to apply such measures ... 
119 
Article 42 adds that, in the case that measures provided for in article 41 
prove to be inadequate, the Security Council may use necessary force to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. It can be argued that, if the 
use of force is allowed as a 'measure' under article 42, a fortiori the creation of 
an international tribunal to judge atrocities in a war context should also be 
permitted. 120 
Additionally, the authority to create a tribunal can be based on the general 
duties of each party under the Geneva Conventions. Though universal 
jurisdiction is restricted to grave breaches of the conventions, each contracting 
party is bound to take measures for the "suppression of all acts contrary to 
provisions of the present Convention." 121 Under general principles of law, 
where a party has failed to act, equity allows a substitution. Where an act ought 
to have been done, equity will deem it done. On this ground the United Nations 
can say that where the country concerned should have taken action to suppress 
11 7 Koran, above, 49. 
118 Timothy L.H. McCormack and Gerry Simpson (eds) The Law of War Crimes - National and 
International Approaches (Kluver Law International , The Hague/London/Boston, 1997), I 98-
199. 
11 9 See: article 41 UN Charter. 
120 McCormack and Simpson, above, 199. 
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war crimes, the Security Council can act as a substitute by vesting jurisdiction 
in the ad hoe tribunal. 122 
Ad Hoe tribunals will always have to bear the suspicion of "victors' justice." 
The same was said about the Nuremberg Trials as well. It is the nature of all 
these tribunals that they are created in the aftermath of wars, and thus, of course, 
by the victorious parties. In the absence of a uniform and global approach, the 
trials of war criminals have generally occurred only where defeat and 
criminality coincide. Yet, this does not have to mean, that their judgements have 
to be biased or that their jurisdiction is questionable. The war crimes tribunals 
are designed to try war criminals rather than only defeated war criminals. 123 The 
ICTY has jurisdiction over all adversaries in the Balkan conflict. Indeed, even if 
one does regard the tribunal essentially directed against Serbs (as all but very 
few ICTY indictments were issued against non-Serbs), it is impossible to 
conceive them as the vanquished in this conflict. 124 The ICC is designed to be 
operative during peace times when distinctions between victor and defeated 
becomes entirely meaningless. 125 
The war crimes tribunals in The Hague and Arusha were established by 
lawful proceedings of the United Nations and based on the UN Charter. They 
are not creations of the victors but of the entire international community and all 
nations member to the United Nations. They do not exercise 'victors' justice' 
but international justice. 
V UPSHOT 
The legal framework for the prosecution of war criminals does exist. So do 
the adequate courts or tribunals the perpetrators could be tried before. Neither 
the tribunals nor the underlying law may be as comprehensive as national 
121 This phrase is common to article 49 First Geneva Convention, article 50 Second Geneva 
Convention, article 146 Third Geneva Convention and article 129 Fourth Geneva Convention. 122 Ruth Wedgwood War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the International War Crimes Tribunal 34 Va. J. Int'l. L. 267,274. 
123 Timothy L.H. McCormack and Gerry Simpson (eds) The Law of War Crimes - National and International Approaches (Kluver Law International, The Hague/London/Boston, 1997), 7. 124 Christopher D. Hox "Tribunal to Cite Serb Chief as War Criminal" (24 April 1995) The New York Times, A I. 
125 McCormack and Simpson, above, 7. 
30 
systems of criminal jurisdiction that took centuries to be developed and agreed 
on. However, they still serve as potent instruments that comprise mere universal 
acceptance. The indictment and prosecution of war criminals thus is far from 
being a 'grey area' of international law. Other than a lack of political will there 
are few obstacles in bringing to justice the worst offenders of international law. 
VI THE CASE OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
With the case of Slobodan Milosevic, the international community has an 
excellent chance to exercise a prime example of its commitment to not let war 
crimes go unpunished any longer. 
On May 27, 1999, the ICTY issued an indictment for the former President 
of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic and four other former Serbian or Yugoslav 
officials, charging them with crimes against humanity and violations of 
international law. 126 The other four indictees remain at large as of today: former 
Serbian President Milan Milutinovic, former Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister 
Nikola Sainovic, former Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs Vlajko 
Stojiljkovic, and former Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff General Dragoljub 
Ojdanic. 127 Specifically, Milosevic, who had already been removed from power 
in October 2000, 128 was charged with personal responsibility for ordering, 
planning, instigating, executing, and aiding and abetting the persecution, 
deportation, and murder of Kosovo Albanians in 1999. This campaign was 
allegedly undertaken with the aim of removing a substantial portion of the 
Kosovo Albanian population from Kosovo in an effort to ensure continued 
Serbian dominance over the area. 129 
The ICTY indicted Milosevic a second time on 29 October 2001, for 
crimes allegedly committed in Croatia ('Croatia indictment'). 130 The indictment 
charges Milosevic with 32 counts of murder, torture, deportation, detention and 
126 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milosevic et al. No. IT-02-54 (first Indictment: 'Kosovo'). 
127 Human Rights Watch - Backgrounder Milosevic and the Chain of Command in Kosovo 
<http: //www.hrw.org/press/2001 /07/chain-of-command.htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 
128 Carlotta Gall "Serbs Seem to Tighten Noose Around Milosevic" (26 February 2001) The 
New York Times available at <http: // www.nytimes.com/2001 /02/26/world/26YUGO.htr> (last 
accessed 14 August 2002) . 
129 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milosevic et al. No. IT-02-54, pages 90-100 . 
130 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milosevic No. IT-01-50-1 (second indictment: 'Croatia' ). 
31 
other atrocities committed during the attempted ethnic cleansing of Croatia from 
1991 to 1992. Specifically, the Indictment alleges that Milosevic, acting alone 
or in concert with others, participated in a joint criminal enterprise with the 
objective to attack civilian populations in Croatia. 
On 11 December 2001 , the ICTY issued a third indictment against 
Milosevic for crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (' Bosnia and Herzegovina 
indictment').131 The indictment includes one count of genocide, one count of 
complicity with genocide and an additional twenty-seven counts of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity arising from the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
between 1992 and 1995. These charges cover the shelling of Sarajevo, the 
murder of thousands of Muslim men at Sr_ brenica, and the Omarska detention 
camp. The Bosnia and Herzegovina indictment is the only one to comprise a 
charge of genocide, based on the allegations alleges that Bosnian Serbs killed 
thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, and further caused serious 
bodily and mental harm to thousands of others by various inhumane acts . 
Milosevic is alleged to incur responsibility for the genocide by his acts and 
omissions in regards to the crimes which were said to have been committed 
with an intent to destroy the groups in whole or in part. 132 
All three indictments allege that the former head of state was a leader of a 
joint criminal enterprise with an objective of making Serbs the dominant group 
in Yugoslavia by exterminating, confining, deporting, sexually assaulting, 
subjugating, and otherwise terrorizing and persecuting non-Serbs in the 
territories. 133 Milosevic is charged both with "individual responsibility" through 
his participation in a joint criminal enterprise as well as "superior 
responsibility," meaning that he knew or should have known that the crimes 
were being committed by subordinates and failed to take necessary measures to 
prevent these crimes from being committed by his subordinates. The charges of 
individual and superior responsibility are spelled out under Articles 7(1) and 
7(3) of the ICTY statute respectively . However, in two prior cases before the 
13 1 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milosevic No. IT-01-51-1 (third indictment: ' Bosnia and Herzegovina'). 
132 The Crimes of War Project The Milosevic Trial - Summaries of the Charges 
<http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-milosevic2-side.html> (last accessed I November 
2002). 
133 Ibid . 
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ICTY 134 the court found that in the context of a joint criminal enterprise, once 
individual responsibility is determined, superior responsibility need not be 
decided because it is subsumed within individual responsibility. Thus, if 
Milosevic is found to have participated in a joint criminal enterprise, he 
apparently cannot also be found guilty of superior responsibility for the same 
crimes. 135 
However, while in publicly indicting Milosevic, the first step towards a war 
crimes trial against him was taken, he still remained safe from the ICTY's 
authority in Belgrade. Despite ongoing work on a new law that would remove 
the ban on the extradition of Yugoslav citizens, thus allowing extradition of 
Milosevic and indictees to the ICTY, Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica 
publicly indicated that he remained opposed to Milosevic's extradition. 136 In a 
February 2001 speech to the Yugoslav parliament, Kostunica maintained that 
the first priority was to try Milosevic at home, rather than risk angering 
nationalists by extraditing Milosevic to an international tribunal. 137 
The western countries - officially supporting the ICTY's efforts - did little 
to put pressure on Yugoslavia to hand over Milosevic. In fact, senior American 
officials initially even opposed his indictment, assuming that this would 
undermine Yugoslavia's commitment to implement the peace agreement. 
Milosevic seemed to have been granted de facto immunity as the ICTY initially 
accepted the Clinton Administration's argument that Milosevic represented the 
keystone to any lasting peace in Bosnia. To justify this inaction, U.S. authorities 
contended that although Milosevic could reasonably be perceived as aiding and 
abetting war crimes and acting complicit in the commission of genocide, there 
was no "smoking gun" direct order bearing his signature. 138 
134 The Krstic Judgement and the Kvocka et al. Judgement, available at the ICTY website, 
above. 
135 Kelly D. Askin/ The Crimes of War Project The Milosevic Trial, Part I 
<http ://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-mi1osevic2.html> (last accessed I November 
2002). 
136 Katarina Kratovac "Law Change Could Mean Milosevic Extradition" (14 February 2001) 
Boston Globe, A13 . 
137 Ibid . 
138 Paul R. Williams and Michael P. Scharf Indict Slobodan Milosevic 
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/trial/scharf.htm I> (last accessed I 
November 2002). 
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However, despite the reluctance to extradite the former head of state, 
Yugoslav leaders began purging the legal system of Milosevic loyalists in early 
2001. The most notable arrest was that of Rade Markovic, the former chief of 
the secret police under the Milosevic regime. Prosecutors hoped that 
information gained from Markovic would lead to the arrest of Milosevic 
himself. 
Although the Yugoslav government made positive efforts to commence 
criminal actions against Milosevic and other protagonists of the war, the ICTY 
publicly opposed Kostunica, emphasizing the importance of extraditing 
Milosevic rather than trying him at home. 139 The Chief Prosecutor of the 
tribunal, Carla Del Ponte, insisted that Milosevic was no different from any 
other person indicted by the ICTY and that Yugoslavia was obligated by 
international law to transfer him into custody in the Hague. 140 The ICTY was 
primarily concerned that any trial in Yugoslavia would neglect the more serious 
alleged war crimes and focus on domestic charges, such as corruption 141 , thus 
spoiling any effects of deterrence expected from a war crimes trial for 
Milosevic. 
When peace in Bosnia appeared to last after all , Milosevic began to lose 
any shield of political utility. 142 The United States finally decided to support the 
ICTY more actively in this case, restating concerns that the Yugoslav judicial 
system was not pursuing Milosevic vigorously enough. Under a measure 
adopted by the United States Congress in 2000, Yugoslavia was called to 
demonstrate its cooperation with the ICTY by the end of March 2001, or risk 
loosing USD 100 million in U.S. aid and consideration for the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank. 
139 Janine di Giovanni "Milosevic Aides to be Arrested Within Days" (24 February 200 I) The 
Times (London), I. 
140 ICTY Press Release of 4 April 200 I, available at <http: // www.un.org/ icty/pressreal/p584-
e.htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 
141 Di Giovanni, above, I. 
142 Paul R. Williams and Michael P. Scharf Indict Slobodan Milosevic 
<http: //www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/trial/scharf.html> (last accessed l 
November 2002). 
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Still, Belgrade officials insisted that Milosevic face trial at home prior to 
any extradition. This insistence apparently was the result Yugoslav domestic 
policy, as Kostunica's feared of being labelled a puppet of the west. 
Without prior warning, on 1 April 2001, just before the end of the U.S. 
deadline for revoking financial aid, Yugoslav police forces conducted a raid to 
arrest Milosevic at his home in Belgrade. 143 After an exchange of gunfire with 
Milosevic's heavily armed bodyguards and lengthy negotiations, Milosevic 
surrendered. 144 Following the arrest, Yugoslav officials reiterated their intent to 
try Milosevic in Belgrade on various charges relating to abuse of power and 
. w corruption. ' 
International pressure continued to grow, however, and Kostunica was 
pressured to transfer Milosevic to the tribunal to face war crime charges. 146 
Accepting the necessity to cooperate and the lesser of two evils, the Yugoslav 
cabinet adopted a decree to transfer Milosevic to the ICTY in June 2001. After 
an unsuccessful attempt to challenge the constitutionality of the extradition 
decree in Yugoslav courts, Milosevic was finally transferred to ICTY's the 
Hague detention facility on 29 June 2001. 147 During his first appearance before 
the tribunal on 3 July 2001, Milosevic refused to enter a plea maintaining that 
he considered it a "false" and "illegal" tribunal. 148 
143 Steven Erlanger "Serb Authorities Arrest Milosevic to End Standoff' (1 April 2001), The 
New York Times, Al. 
144 Ibid . 
145 Human Rights Watch - Backgrounder Milosevic and the Chain of Command in Kosovo 
<http: //www.hrw.org/press/200 I /07/chain-of-command.htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 
146 Erlanger, above, A I. 
147 CNN .corn/ World Milosevic Jailed in The Hague (29 June 200 I), 
<http: //www.cnn.com/200 I/WORLD/europe/06/28/milosevic.court/> (last accessed 1 
November 2002). 
148 ICTY Press Advisory of29 June 2001 , available at 
<http://www.un.org/ icty/pressreal/ADV00629.htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 
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On 8 November 2001, the Trial Chamber of the tribunal decided an initial 
motion to dismiss brought forward by Milosevic and amici curiae. 149 In the 
motion it was argued that: 
1) the tribunal was an illegal entity because the UN Security Council 
lacked the power to establish it; 
2) the prosecutor had not maintained prosecutorial independence, and was 
therefore in violation of article 16, paragraph 2 of the ICTY's statute; 
3) the tribunal was impermissibly tainted with bias against Milosevic; 
4) the tribunal lacked judicial competence to prosecute Milosevic due to his 
status as the former President of Yugoslavia; 
5) the tribunal lacked judicial competence to prosecute Milosevic due to his 
unlawful surrender and extradition to the Hague; and 
6) the tribunal lacked general jurisdiction. 150 
The ICTY Trial Chamber rejected each of these arguments, relying on 
Article 7, paragraph 2 of the tribunal's statute. 151 The tribunal rejected 
Milosevic's claims of immunity due to his status as the former President of 
Yugoslavia, 152 stating that article 7(2), which rejected head of state immunity, 
reflected an accepted principle of customary international law. 153 Additionally, 
the Trial Chamber relied on the Pinochet case and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. 
All three indictments ('Kosovo', 'Croatia' and 'Bosnia and Herzegovina') 
have been confirmed by the Trial Chamber. 154 The initial appearance for 
Milosevic to enter pleas to the counts in the Croatia indictment took place on 29 
October 2001 As Milosevic decided to maintain his strategy of refusing to 
acknowledge the ICTY's jurisdiction and refusing to enter a plea, the Trial 
149 On 6 September, 30 October and 27 November 200 I, the Registrar of the ICTY appointed 
Steven Kay, Branislav Tapuskovic and Michail Wladimiroffto act as amici curiae in the three 
cases. 
150 See: ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milosevic et al, No. IT-99-37-PT (first Indictment: 'Kosovo'). 
151 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milosevic et al, No. IT-99-37-PT, pages 26-34. 
152 Ibid; see also: Deborah Tedford, "Head of War Crimes Tribunal Seeking Evidence of 
Atrocities" (9 April 1999) The Houston Chronicle, A4. 
153 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milosevic et al, No. IT-99-37-PT, page 28. 
154 The Kosovo indictment was confirmed on 8 October 200 I, the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
indictment was confirmed on 22 November 200 I. 
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Chamber consequently entered a plea of "not guilty" on his behalf on every 
count of the indictment. 155 The same happened for the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
indictment on 11 December 2001. 156 
On 1 February 2002, the Appeals Chamber ordered that the three 
indictments be tried together in one single trial, following the prosecution's 
argument that all three indictments were part of Milosevic' s master plan to 
create an ethnically pure 'Greater Serbia' .157 
The trial commenced on 12 February with evidence relevant only to the 
charges relating to Kosovo. Milosevic continued to refuse to recognize the 
court, disdainfully glancing at his watch during the proceedings as if he were 
bored, and dismissively addressing the presiding judge, Justice Richard May, as 
"Mr. May." 158 Refusing to argue the allegations brought forward against him, 
Milosevic initially just went on to discredit the court, dismissing it as a political 
body prejudiced to rule against him. He also claimed that putting him on trial 
was equal to trying the Serbian people at a whole. This allegation was promptly 
rejected by Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte emphasizing that the trial of 
Milosevic in no way was intended to impose collective guilt on the Serbian 
people.159 
Eventually, when the prosecution presented the first witnesses in order to 
prove and establish Milosevic's central role in the atrocities committed during 
the Balkan wars, the accused began to challenge these allegations, skilfully 
cross-examining the witnesses. Central to his defence strategy has been the 
repeat of the assertion that it was not Serbian forces who drove Albanians out of 
Yugoslavia, but rather NATO' s 1999 bombing campaign that killed hundreds of 
innocent civilians and destroyed a large number of non-military properties. 160 
155 ICTY The /CTY at a Glance (Case Information Sheets/ Milosevic) 
<http://www.un .org/ icty/glance/ index.htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 
156 Ibid . 
157 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milosevic et al. No. IT-02-54 (combined indictment 'Kosovo, Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina'). 
158 Kelly D. Askin/ The Crimes of War Project The Milosevic Trial, Part I 
<http: //www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-milosevic2.html> (last accessed I November 
2002). 
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On 25 July 2002, the Trial Chamber gave the prosecution until 16 May 2003 
to present further evidence for all three indictments. 161 
VII AND ALL THE OTHERS? 
The trial of Slobodan Milosevic is a major benchmark for international 
justice, but it also spotlights the failure to arrest other architects of the Balkan 
wars. "This trial is a great step forward for justice, but equally notable are those 
indicted war criminals missing from the dock," says Richard Dicker, director of 
Human Rights Watch's International Justice Program. "Too many of the most 
senior Serb indictees remain at large." 162 
Even today the arrest policy by NATO troops remams sporadic and 
inconsistent. The Chief Prosecutor of the tribunal, Carla Del Ponte, noted in her 
address to the Security Council on 21 November 2000, that the rate of arrests of 
the indicted persons by the international military forces has dropped 
dramatically. 163 Many of the fugitives from the tribunal, such as Radovan 
Karadzic, former president of the Serb Democratic Party for Bosnia-
Herzegovina and General Ratko Mladic, former commander of the Bosnian 
Serb Army, are at large and reportedly in territory controlled by NA TO forces. 
This is not only frustrating for those trying to bring to justice the perpetrators of 
the worst crimes 164, but also poses a severe threat to the concept of universal 
justice and serves as a bad precedent, compromising the international 
community's aim of deterrence. 
A Law Without Enforcement 
By far the biggest problem to be faced is the ability to compel those accused 
of war crimes to actually appear before a tribunal. The tribunals in The Hague 
161 ICTY The !CTY at a Glance (Case Information Sheets/ Milosevic) 
<http: //www.un.org/ icty/glance/ index.htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 
162 Human Rights Watch Milosevic: Historic Trial Commences - Other Indicted War Criminals 
Remain at large (HR W Press Release of 7 February 2002), 
<http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/02/milotrial.htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 
163 ICTY Press Release of 29 June 200 I: Statement of the Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte (UN Doc. 
JL/P.J.S ./542-e), available at <http://www.un.org/icty/pressrea1/p598-e.htm> (last accessed I 
November 2002). 
164 Jane Perlez "War Crimes Prosecutor Vents Frustration" (22 May 1996) The New York Times, 
A8 (relating to some expressions of frustration by former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, Richard 
Goldstone). 
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and Arusha have constantly been criticized for their inherent weaknesses as they 
have no enforcement power and thus must rely on national governments and 
NA TO forces to seize and transport suspects. 165 The lack of state cooperation in 
this regard has become a major obstacle to the effectiveness, as well as the 
international esteem of the tribunals. Politically inspired delays in the arrest of 
indicted war criminals pose the most serious threat to the credibility and the 
very essence of the tribunals. 
This problem has been particularly evident in Yugoslavia, where it has been 
difficult to compel all sides accused in the conflict to appear before the ICTY. 
Only about half of those indicted have come into the custody of the tribunal and 
only a minority of them through arrests secured by A TO forces on the 
ground. 166 The slow way in which suspects have been detained seriously risks 
rendering ineffective and futile the enormous efforts of the tribunal to 
investigate crimes under international law and has considerably hampered the 
prosecution of those who have been detained. 167 
The international force will only arrest suspects whom it encounters in the 
normal course of its duties. 168 It has failed to arrest some suspects who were 
indicted by the ICTY whose whereabouts are clearly known and who could be 
easily apprehended, such as Karadzic and Mladic, believed to have been 
involved in some of the worst atrocities of the entire Yugoslav conflict. 169 The 
case of Karadzic is the most unfortunate. When he was indicted on charges of 
genocide and crimes against humanity in July 1995, UN troops in Bosnia could 
165 Issues and Controversies on File War Crimes Tribunals : An Jn-Depth Analysis 
<http: //www.facts.com/ icof/warintro.htm> (last accessed I November 2002). 
166 Amnesty International Milosevic 's Indictment -- Amnesty International Welcomes 
Decision That Head of State May Be Held Responsible for Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes (Al News Service, 27 May 1999), 
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have undoubtedly arrested him as he moved freely within the area. The same is 
probably true for Mladic, who was indicted for the same charges. 170 
The tribunal's first trial Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic 171 resulted in a 
conviction, but it illustrates some problems inherent in the ICTY. 172 The most 
obvious problem for the ICTY is that those most responsible for the policy of 
ethnic cleansing are safe from prosecution in Belgrade or in Bosnian Serb 
territory. 173 As important as the Tadic trial is as a precedent, Tadic himself was 
only a very minor player in the conflict. On the other hand, some of the most 
notorious suspects for Bosnian war crimes are still at large. Neither Bosnian 
Serb authorities nor the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will cooperate in 
· h 174 arrestmg t em. 
B A Question of Authority 
The Military Annex to the Dayton agreement authorized the Implementation 
Force (IFOR) "[t]o take such actions as required, including the use of necessary 
force , to ensure compliance with this Annex, and to ensure its own 
protection." 175 But the agreement did not technically oblige IFOR to apprehend 
or transfer to the custody of the ICTY suspected war criminals, or otherwise 
facilitate the work of the tribunal. 176 This absence of a direct enforcement 
mechanism in the ICTY statute left the tribunal dependent on state cooperation. 
Sadly, neither the countries of the former Yugoslavia nor the NA TO member 
170 Richard J. Goldstone The Role of the United Nations in the Prosecution of 
international War Criminals (WUStL UN Conference Papers), available at 
<http: // law.wustl.edu/igls/Unconfpapers/p 119 _ Goldstone.pd f> (last accessed I November 
2002), I l 9ff. 
171 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a. k. a "Dute", Case No. IT-94-l-AR72 . 
172 Jonathan A. Bush Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War and Its limitations, 93 Colum. L. 
Rev . 2022, 2083. 
173 Jelena Pejic Conceptuali:ing Violence: Present and Future Developments in international 
lmv 60 Alb. L. Rev. 841 , 850. 
174 CNN World>Europe Bosnian Envoy Calls/or Karadzic Arrest (20 November 2000), 
<http ://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/ I l/20/bosnia.envoy> (last accessed I November 
2002). 
175 This phrase is found in the Dayton Peace Agreement - Proximity Peace Talks (Wright 
Patterson Air force Base, Ohio, November 1995) as well as the Military Technical Agreement 
between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia of 9 June 1999 and United Nations 
Resolution I 031 ( 1995). 
176 Jim Hopper (Balkan Institute) Dayton 's Mandate/or Apprehending War Criminal 
<http ://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/trial/hooper.html> (last accessed I 
November 2002). 
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states have been particularly enthusiastic to actively enforce the orders of the 
ICTY. 
The non-cooperation of the states exposed the weak enforcement mechanism 
of the tribunal. Though endowed on paper with authority to order arrests and 
impose all manner of sanctions, the tribunal lacks any true power to assert that 
authority. It relies entirely upon the cooperation of states, yet it has no ability to 
coerce such cooperation. The tribunal noted in 1994 that it "must rely upon the 
domestic legal system and the enforcement machinery of each State." 
177 The 
tribunal has thus sometimes been seen as "the epitome of a paper tiger.
178 
Even the former president of the ICTY, Antonio Cassese, observed in 1996 
that the I CTY was 
[l]ike an armless and legless giant which needs artificial limbs to act and move. These 
limbs are the State authorities ( ... ) the national prosecutors, judges and police officers. If 
state authorities fail to carry out their responsibilities, the giant is paralysed, no matter how 
determined its efforts.
179 
In theory, all states are obligated to cooperate with the ICTY and to execute 
arrest warrants, extradite the accused, and provide all necessary information 
requested by the tribunal. 180 The tribunal has the power to call upon any 
national state to produce defendants who are hiding in its territory. Under 
articles 25, 48, and 103 of the United Nations Charter, member states are 
obliged to cooperate. 181 If states fail to do so the tribunal can report the failure 
to the Security Council. 182 However, this method proved to be essentially 
177 [First] Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, of 14 November 1994 (UN Docs. A/49/342; 
S/ 1994/1007), 2, 84, avai lable at <http://www.un.org/ icty/rapportan/first-94.htm> (last accessed 
I November 2002). 
178 Lucas W. Andrews Sailing Around the Flat Earth: The International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia as a Failure of Jurisprudential Theory 11 Emory lnt'l. L. R. 
179 Jelena Pejic Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in International 
Law 60 Alb . L. Rev. 841, 853. 
180 See: Rules 56, 58 and 8 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (U.N. Doc. 
IT/32/REV.20). 
181 Ruth Wedgwood War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the International War 
Crimes Tribunal 34 Va. J. Int'l. L. 267,269. 
182 See: Ru le 59(b) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, above. 
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ineffective. Though the Security Council passed a number of resolutions calling 
for state compliance with ICTY orders, those resolutions were regularly ignored 
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Because of the lack of state cooperation, the tribunal has had to develop other 
means of enforcing its authority . It has employed different enforcement 
methods 183, which are based both on the provisions of the ICTY Statute. The 
statutory mechanisms utilized by the tribunal included proceedings under rule 
61 of the ICTY Rules of Evidence and Procedure, which provide the tribunal 
with an opportunity to hear the case against the accused in absentia and issue an 
international arrest warrants afterwards, freezing of indictees ' financial assets in 
order to limit their possibility to evade international justice, 184 political pressure 
through condemnation by U.N. organs as well as the use of specific economic 
sanctions. 185 The success of these efforts proved to be very limited because they 
have been used inconsistently or directed at countries already isolated by the 
international community. A more controversial enforcement method has been 
the use of individual financial rewards for the apprehension of indicted war 
criminals. 186 However, the legality of captures performed for cash rewards has 
not been examined by the tribunal. Scholars point out that this practice could 
result in legal liability of the Western governments for the consequences of 
bounty hunters' actions.187 Furthermore it appears to be rather doubtful whether 
encouraging abductions for profit is an acceptable method of achieving the 
paramount goal of international justice. 
Despite the use of the enforcement methods outlined above, the majority of 
accused war criminals remained at large. The use of military force to arrest 
indicted persons - potentially the most effective method of enforcement - has 
only been made use of extremely rarely so far. 
183 Michael P. Scharf The Tools/or Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the New 
Millennium: l essons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal 49 DePaul L. Rev. 925 , 978 . 
184 Scharf, above, 946. 
185 Scharf, above, 927. 
186 The tribunal has not offered rewards for the capture of accused persons, but the United States 
instituted a war crimes reward program, promising cash rewards for information leading to the 
arrest of persons wanted by the ICTY . 
187 Scharf, above, 949-51. 
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C Fatal Reluctance 
NA TO forces have been incredibly reluctant to arrest alleged or indicted war 
criminals. They have however done so on a number of occasions. A successful 
precedent for the use of military force was established in June 1997 with the 
successful arrest of Slavko Dokmanovic, one of the secretly indicted war 
criminals. 188 NATO troops do not suffer from a lack of capabilities, but rather 
from a lack of political will to enforce ICTY indictments. If ordered, many of 
those publicly and secretly indicted could be arrested and brought before the 
tribunal in a short period of time. Yet, even after this successful precedent, 
forceful arrests remained sporadic to date. 
NATO troops are even reported to systematically avoid confrontations with 
indicted war criminals. Statements report of NA TO allowing indicted war 
criminals to pass through checkpoints and allowing indictees to move openly in 
patrolled areas. 189 At times, IFOR troops even left areas that they had been 
patrolling to avoid encounters with indictees. NA TO was also initially reluctant 
to distribute lists and descriptions of indicted war criminals to IFOR troops that 
would enable them to identify indictees. 190 
To explain their apparent unwillingness to do so, political leaders of NATO 
countries bring forward a number of arguments. However, none of these 
arguments is convincing: 
1 Authorization 
Sometimes it is argued that the NA TO forces simply did not have the legal 
authority to carry out arrests on behalf of the ICTY. This in not true. NA TO 
troops have legal authority under international law to use force in arresting 
indicted war criminals. The mandate of IFOR and of the Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) 191 included authorization to use military force in arresting indictees. 192 
188 Scharf, above, 960 and 970-71. See: ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dokmanovic, IT-95-l 3a-PT. 
189 Jim Hopper (Balkan Institute) Dayton 's Mandate for Apprehending War Criminal 
<http ://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/trial/hooper.html> (last accessed I 
November 2002). 
190 Ibid . 
191 SFOR replaced I FOR on 20 December 1996. 
192 Michael P. Scharf The Tools for Enforcing international Criminal Justice in the New 
Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal 49 DePaul L. Rev., 925, 952; Jelena Pejic 
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The curity Council authorized IFOR to take such action a required. 
including the u e of necessary force. to ensure partie ' compliance with their 
obligation to implement the tem1s of the Dayton Accords. 
The authority to enforce peace in Bosnia in general. and to enforce the arrest 
\\'arrants of the ICTY in particular. is deri\'ed from the ecurity Council 
mandate. The Security Council decided to replace PROFOR troop on the 
ground in Bosnia with ATO troops in 1995 and ub equently pa sed 
Resolution 1031 (1995) 193• delegating military enforcement power to the 
member states and obligating them to act "through or in cooperation with" 
ATO to implement the Dayton Accords . Resolution 1031 (1995) tated that 
the international military force could "take such actions a required. including 
the use of necessary force. to ensure compliance with Annex 1- of the Peace 
Agreement." Thus. NATO-led troops were authorized by the Security Council 
to use military power to enforce compliance of the parties with the Dayton 
Accords. This includes the search and arrest of persons indicted by the ICTY. 
A TO's authority to use force in arresting the indictees is based on a mandate 
of the Security Council. as expressed in its resolutions. as well as consent of the 
states of the former Yugoslavia to the presence of A TO troops in Bosnia. 
2 The Risk of Casualties 
In trying to explain why A TO troops did not arrest indicted war criminals 
many scholars point out the evident risk for the personnel involved. Ob iously, 
military leaders were not prepared to risk the lives of their soldiers. The 
Pentagon feared that involvement of IFOR troops in operations to arrest 
indicted war criminals would expose U.S. soldiers to retaliation. Pentagon 
officials argued that American casualties \ ould undermine public and 
· 1 c D 19.t congress10na support 1or ayton. 
Conceptuali::ing Violence: Present and Future Developments in international l aw 60 Alb . L. 
Rev. 841 , 851. 
193 UN Resolution 1031 (1995), S/RES/1 031 , of 15 December 1995. 
194 Jim Hopper (Balkan Institute) Dayton 's Mandate for Apprehending War Criminal 
<http ://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/trial/hooper.html> (last accessed I 
November 2002). 
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The Western political and military leadership feared that possible casualties 
might result from enforcement attempts 195 and assumed that arrests would 
threaten implementation of military provisions of the Dayton Accords and thus 
undermine peace in Bosnia. 196 NATO troops, consistent with their political 
leaders' official position, did not feel any obligation to arrest indicted war 
criminals. The Commander of IFOR forces in Bosnia, Admiral Leighton Smith, 
interpreted the mandate in the most limiting manner, claiming that "it was not 
the mission of his forces to go after indicted war criminals." 197 Indeed, NA TO 
military commanders perceived active pursuit of the accused war criminals as a 
threat to both security of the troops and peace in Bosnia. 198 Therefore, in the 
first years of Dayton Accords the NATO policy was to arrest the indictees only 
if they surrendered or were found by accident. 199 
The fear for the soldier's lives is probably well founded as some of the 
indictees such as Karadzic and Mladic obviously still enjoy massive public 
support in their former areas of influence and are also reported to maintain 
bands of heavily armed bodyguards.200 During the raids that led to the arrests of 
some indictees, a number of NATO personnel were injured, but no fatalities 
occurred so far. However, the precedents mentioned above illustrate that NATO 
forces boast the necessary ability to apprehend indictees without taking 
unjustifiable risks. 201 Finally, although it is understandable that putting the risks 
of their own people on the line for the abstract concept of justice is something 
that politicians and military leaders refrain from wherever possible, it has to be 
said that the risk involved in this type of military operation is something 
inherent to NATO's mandate in the area of former Yugoslavia. This is exactly 
195 Gary Jonathan Bass Stay the Hand of Vengeance - The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton/Oxford, 2000), 237-46 . 
196 Michael P. Scharf The Tools/or Enforcing international Criminal Justice in the New 
Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 925, 953-55. 
197 Scharf, above, 955. 
198 Bass, above, 246-50. 
199 Bass, above, 248. 
200 Richard J. Newman Hunting War Criminals: The First Account of Secret U.S. Missions in 
Bosnia (World Report, 6 July 1998) 
<http: //www.specialoperations.com/ Army/Delta_Force/bosnia.html>; CNN World New Story 
Who Will Catch Bosnia War Criminals: Pentagon Declines to Participate 
<http: //www.cnn.com/ WORLD/9612/l 9/pentagon.bosnia/> (both last accessed I November 
2002). 
201 See e.g.: Thomas B. Hunter Special Forces Arrest War Crimes Suspects 
<http://www.specialoperations.com/Focus/warcrimes.html> (last accessed I November 2002. 
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what TO force have been deployed for. A former Chief Pro ecutor of the 
ICTY, Richard Gold tone remark : 
\: hat [are] American troops. armed and in uniform. doing in Bo nia if the) [are] not 
prepared to take risk in the performance of their duties?
20
-
3 The Lack of Political Will 
In the end, the only reason why A TO force do not a ti\'ely participate in 
the enforcement of ICTY indictments is a lack of ufficient political 
commitment from the West to use military force in apprehending indicted war 
criminals. 203 In fact, the tribunal faces enormous difficulty in generating the 
political will of the international community in enforcing its orders. There is the 
inherent difficulty of operating in an environment where the main goal of the 
international community and Security Council is to establish peace rather than 
justice. Any pursuit of justice, and especially the arrest of suspected war 
criminals, will likely be preceded by the alleged need to accomplish ome sort 
of peace on the ground. 
In Bosnia, the A TO-led forces have chosen not to arrest some of the 
indicted war criminals out of concern that such actions might exacerbate the 
situation. 20-t Senior American officials initially assumed that the indictment of 
Milosevic would undermine his commitment to implement the peace agreement. 
The Dayton negotiators were also reluctant to order the arrest of Karadzic and 
Mladic. As in the case of Milosevic, U.S. and allied leaders fear that the 
apprehension of the two most senior Bosnian Serb indictees would spark 
202 Richard J. Goldstone The Role of the United Nations in the Prosecution of International War 
Criminals (WUStL UN Conference Papers), available at 
<http:// law.wustl.edu/ igls/Unconfpapers/p 119 _ Goldstone.pdf.> (last accessed I ovember 
2002), I l 9ff. 
203 Kristen Cibelli and Tamy Guberek (Tufts University) Justice Unkno11'n, 
Justice Unsatisfied? Bosnian NGOs Speak about the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia <http://www.epiic.com/about/justicereport.pdf.> (last accessed I ovember 
2002), 6. 
204 Paul Goble (Radio Free Europe, 28 May 1999) Yugoslavia: Analysis From Washington: 
Negotiating With A War Criminal? 
<http: //www.rferl.org/nca/features/l 999/05/F.RU.990528132443.html> (last accessed I 
November 2002). 
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Bosnian Serb retaliation to the peace accords and risk the lives of NATO 
troops. 205 
Although it may be desirable to bring to justice those responsible for gross 
atrocities in the context of every war, of course, ultimately war crimes 
prosecution will be subject to realpolitik. One must weigh foreign policy and 
intelligence interests against the importance of enforcing the law. It may 
sometimes not be possible to bring about a peace settlement if a war crimes 
tribunal is going forward with active prosecutions of the state leaders of the 
belligerent parties. Even if the political leadership should change, it may be 
impossible for the new governments to hand over former leaders and remain in 
power.206 
Rightly, the main object of all international efforts in all post-war societies is 
to quell the fighting. 207 In that context the achievement of justice is mostly seen 
as secondary and sometimes even counterproductive to the paramount goal of 
peace. This perception, however, is not necessarily correct. In fact, justice can 
be an important step to overcome the traumas of peace and also serves as a 
deterrent to war-criminals-to-be. The rationale for establishing the Hague 
tribunal was that it would assist the peace process by punishing at least some of 
h ·1 f . . 208 t ose gm ty o atroc1t1es. 
Punishing perpetrators of horrible crimes is an important step toward healing 
a strife-torn society. In this context, the world community has a moral 
responsibility to seek out justice when national governments are unable or 
unwilling to take action. Many proponents of war crimes tribunals also believe 
that the threat of appearing before a war crimes tribunal can serve as a useful 
deterrent to those who might otherwise commit atrocities with impunity. 209 
205 Jim Hopper (Balkan Institute) Dayton 's Mandate for Apprehending War Criminal 
<http: //www.pbs .org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/tria l/hooper. html> (last accessed I 
November 2002). 
206 Ruth Wedgwood War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the International War 
Crimes Tribunal 34 Va. J. lnt ' l. L. 267, 274. 
207 Wedgwood, above, 275 . 
208 Geoffrey Robertson Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (Penguin 
Books, London, UK, 1999), 318. 
209 Issues and Controversies on File War Crimes Tribunals: An Jn-Depth Analysis 
<http ://www.facts.com/ icof/warintro .htm> (last accessed I November 2002) . 
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Without justice, lasting peace cannot be achieved. The individualization and 
decollectivisation of guilt, placing responsibility on the leaders and the 
perpetrators of atrocities rather than the whole communities help to bring about 
peace and reconciliation.2 10 It is a fallacy to believe that the international 
community would rely on the consent of persons indicted by war cnmes 
tribunals. On the contrary, negotiating with the perpetrators of massive 
violations of international law effectively discredits any efforts for durable 
results. A country that is not willing to dissociate itself from the perpetrators of 
war crimes will never be able to cope with its past in the long term. 
A peaceful society cannot be built upon repression and ignorance towards 
atrocities committed. Those responsible for these types of violations have 
demonstrated that they are not willing to recognize the concept of a peaceful 
and humane society. They are not acceptable partners for peace negotiations. 
These persons have to be brought to justice in order to unmistakably express the 
international communities commitment to the punishment of this behaviour. 
In Yugoslavia, some of the military leaders, including U.S. General Wesley 
Clark, who became SFOR Commander in 1997, endorsed the view that 
[u]nless the killers were removed from society, the peace agreement could not be 
successfully implemented and NATO's troops would be bogged down for years in a costly 
k 
. . . 2 11 peace eepmg m1ss1on. 
Not the arrest warrants of international war cnmes tribunals, but their 
continuous non-enforcement has to be seen as an obstacle to effective 
implementation of the political side of peace agreements. An international 
criminal tribunal plays an integral role in the reconciliation of war torn societies 
but it can only be as effective as the collective political will and military power 
2 10 Theodor Meron War Crimes Law Comes of Age - Essays (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998), 
187. 
2 11 Gary Jonathan Bass Stay the Hand of Vengeance - The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton/Oxford, 2000), 266-67 . General Clark ' s position received 
support from political leaders in the United States and Great Britain . Madeleine Albright, then 
Secretary of the U.S. State Department and Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, pressed for a 
more forceful NATO policy in arresting indicted war criminals . 
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of those who create and support it. 212 Regrettably, this view has taken much too 
long to receive some reluctant acceptance at international level. Finally, in 1998 
the NA TO leadership noted that "detentions by SFOR over the past year of war 
crimes indictees have contributed to the peace process" and that progress in 
cooperation with the ICTY will "help to create the conditions in which a 
NATO-led military presence is no longer needed."2 13 
VIII CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, war crimes will be subject to realpolitik. This will always leave 
war crimes law, as practised through the creation of ad hoe tribunals, open to 
accusations of selectivity, partiality and ' victors justice' . State interests seldom 
readily yield to the dictates of legality. Too often, the price of peace is 
considered to be an abdication of war crimes proceedings. So every war crimes 
tribunal is also an exercise in partial justice.2 14 
The inability to bring accused war criminals to justice has been extremely 
frustrating for the prosecutors of the ICTY in The Hague. Under the terms of the 
Dayton Accord, the governments of the Balkan region are all obliged to turn 
over accused war criminals and NA TO forces are authorized to apprehend them. 
Yet, so far that has largely not occurred. The various governments are reluctant 
to surrender their nationals and the NA TO commanders are wary of trying to 
forcibly arrest people. In 1996, IFOR commander U.S. Admiral Leighton 
Smith, contended that trying to arrest war criminals might detract from his basic 
mission, which is to maintain the peace. That may not be ideal , the admiral 
admitted.2 15 
It certainly is not. A war crimes tribunal can only be as effective as the 
political will to enforce its orders and judgements. There will be no lasting 
212 David J. Scheffer Developments in International Criminal Law: The United States and the 
International Criminal Court, 93 Am . J. lnt'l L. 12, 2 1. 
213 NATO Press Release M-NAC-1 (98)60 of May 28, 1998: Statement on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in 
Luxembourg, available at <http://www.nato. int/docu/pr/ l 998/p98-060e.htm> (last accessed I 
November 2002). 
214 Timothy L.H . McCormack and Gerry Simpson (eds) The law of War Crimes - National and 
International Approaches (Kluver Law International , The Hague/London/Boston, 1997), 8. 
215 Chris Hedges "Rocky Path for U.S. Admiral in Bosnia" (28 April 1996) The New York 
Times, A 19. 
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peace without justice. And there can be no justice without credible mechanisms 
of enforcement. The international community has much to lose in abandoning 
this important cause. The credibility of international humanitarian law depends 
on war crimes tribunals to hold accountable those responsible for gross 
violations.
216 
A frustrated Judge Goldstone argues that arresting the accused war 
criminals, especially Karadzic and Mladic, "seems to me not only in the interest 
of justice but in the interests of peace." This is so, Goldstone contends, because 
"if people in positions of authority cannot be brought to The Hague, the 
important deterrent value of the tribunal will be destroyed. "217 
216 Theodor Meron War Crimes law Comes of Age - Essays (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998), 
187. 
2 17 Jane Perlez " War Crimes Prosecutor Vents Frustration" (22 May 1996) The New York Times, 
A8. 
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